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Abstract.	 	This	essay	takes	its	point	of	departure	from	the	intellectual	milieu	in	
the	mid	1980s	that	gave	rise	to	Luc	Boltanski	and	Laurent	Thévenot’s	book,	On	
Justification:	Economies	of	Worth.	It	shows	how	exposure	to	ideas	and	concepts	
in	that	book	came	to	take	varied	forms	as	they	were	elaborated	and	modified	in	
the	 work	 of	 an	 American	 sociologist	 across	 several	 decades	 of	 research	 in	
diverse	empirical	settings.	
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Introduction	
	
Luc	Boltanski	and	Laurent	Thévenot’s	influential	book,	De	La	Justification.	Les	Économies	
de	la	Grandeur	(On	Justification.	The	Economies	of	Worth)	(1991,	2006)	was	published	
more	than	25	years	ago.	But	the	ideas	and	concepts	of	that	important	work	were	already	
having	an	influence	even	before	the	book’s	publication,	first	through	the	PhD	seminar	that	
Boltanski	and	Thévenot	taught	together	at	the	École	des	Hautes	Études	en	Sciences	
Sociales	(EHESS)	and	later	as	the	manuscript	circulated	among	their	Parisian	circles,	
including	economists	of	the	“Conventions”	School	and	sociologists	in	the	Groupe	de	
Sociologie	Politique	et	Morale	(GSPM)	which	they	founded	in	1985.	
	
I	was	one	of	those	sociologists.	And	(adopting	a	phrase	from	the	technology	community)	it	
is	as	an	“early	adopter”	that	I	write	this	essay.		Being	an	early	user	of	the	concepts	of	“les	
économies	de	la	grandeur”	(economies	of	worth)	does	not	mean	that	I	write	from	a	
privileged	position.	My	understandings	and	misunderstandings	(more	on	this,	elaborated	
below)	are	no	more	worthy	than	the	initial	insights	of	a	reader	who	has	just	now	been	
inspired	by	reading	On	Justification	for	the	first	time.	They	are	neither	better	nor	worse.	
They	are	valuable	because	they	are	different.		
	
My	misunderstandings	come	with	a	history	–	having	heard	the	concepts	being	worked	out	
while	taking	written	form,	and	having	used	them	as	theoretical	reference	points	(even	
while	departing	from	them)	for	several	decades.	They	are	valuable	because	they	have	a	
history;	and	there	are	limits	to	their	usefulness	for	the	same	reason.	Perhaps	someone	
less	familiar	with	their	genesis	could	see	the	connections	among	the	concepts	more	
clearly	and	be	less	likely	to	misinterpret.	Certainly	the	acolytes	will	complain	that	I	have	
not	been	true	to	the	original	text.	It	is	for	the	reader	to	be	the	judge.	For	me,	science	
means	that	my	first	and	last	fidelities	are	to	be	faithful	to	my	research	materials	–	not	
because	of	some	positivist	belief	in	the	“facts”	but	because	I	find	that	the	constraints	
posed	by	data	(whether	ethnographic,	comparative	historical,	or	network	analytic)	are	
likely	to	be	more	interesting,	challenging,	and	potentially	creative	than	those	posed	by	
theory.	For	good	or	bad,	that	is	my	disposition.		And	it	is	from	this	disposition	that	I	write	
an	essay	in	which	the	reader	can	see	how	a	set	of	ideas	to	which	I	was	exposed	in	my	
formative	years	came	to	take	varied	forms	as	they	were	elaborated	and	modified	across	
several	decades	of	research	in	diverse	empirical	settings.	
	
	
	 3	
Early	Adoption	
	
I	was	fortunate	to	meet	Luc	Boltanski	in	the	Spring	of	1982.	Luc	was	visiting	at	Harvard’s	
Center	for	European	Studies	where	I	was	a	graduate	research	associate	completing	the		
last	phase	of	my	dissertation.	We	became	fast	friends,	solidified	when	I	saw	him	nearly	
every	day	for	several	months	in	the	spring/early	summer	of	1983,	having	been	invited	by	
Pierre	Bourdieu	to	be	a	fellow	at	the	Centre	de	Sociologie	Européenne	in	Paris.	Let’s	just	
say	it	was	tremendously	exciting:	talking	with	Bourdieu	and	Boltanski;	meeting	Laurent	
Thévenot,	Alain	Desrosières,	Bruno	Latour,	and	others;	and	experiencing	the	energy	
around	Actes	de	la	Recherche	en	Sciences	Sociales	(probably	the	last	moment	of	real	
innovation	in	the	field	of	non-digital	social	scientific	journal	publishing).		From	Paris,	I	took	
the	Orient	Express	to	Budapest	where	I	spent	the	final	months	of	the	summer	doing	the	
field	work	which,	continued	over	the	next	three	years,	would	become	the	basis	for	my	
paper,	“Work,	Worth,	and	Justice.”1		
	
That	paper	was	drafted	in	the	Fall	of	1986,	while	I	was	a	visiting	fellow	at	the	newly	
founded	GSPM,2	where	Boltanski	and	Thévenot	were	beginning	to	write	Les	Économies	de	
la	Grandeur	(the	working	title	of	the	manuscript	first	published	in	1987).3		During	those	
months	I	was	literally	moving	back	and	forth	every	couple	of	weeks	from	field	work	in	
																																																						
1		This	paper	was	first	published	in	French	by	Bourdieu	in	Actes	de	la	recherche	en	sciences	sociales	in	1990	
(Stark	1990a).	The	original	English	version	circulated	as	a	Working	Paper	from	Harvard’s	Center	for	
European	Studies	(Stark	1990b).	Because	Viviana	Zelizer	assigned	the	unpublished	paper	for	many	years	in	
her	economic	sociology	seminar	at	Princeton	it	had	a	readership	larger	than	that	of	some	other	published	
papers.	I’m	grateful	to	her	for	giving	it	an	audience	during	its	long	hibernation	before	it	eventually	appeared	
as	Chapter	2	of	The	Sense	of	Dissonance.		For	a	more	detailed	account	of	the	nearly	20	year	delay	from	draft	
to	publication	see	the	Preface	in	Stark	(2009,	pp.	xi-xv).		
 
2 The	formation	of	the	GSPM	was	an	institutional	marker	of	Boltanski’s	separation	from	Bourdieu,	his	
mentor,	co-author,	and	friend.	The	resulting	conflict	was	acrimonious.	During	this	time,	I	did	what	an	
American	sociologist	was	supposed	to	do:	I	talked	to	people	in	camps	who	weren’t	talking	to	each	other	
and,	in	fact,	forbade	even	their	students	from	doing	so.	I	break	no	confidences	(their	personal	affection	for	
each	other	famous	for	running	much	deeper	than	their	temporary	professional	antagonism)	when	I	report	
that	Bourdieu’s	first	question	at	lunch	was	always	“Tell	me.	How’s	Luc?”	and	Boltanski’s	first	question	at	
dinner	“How’s	Pierre?”					
 
3	De	la	Justification.	Les	Économies	de	la	Grandeur	originally	published	in	1991	is	actually	a	reedition	of	a	
prior	book,	published	in	1987	by	the	Presses	Universitaires	de	France	in	its	“Cahiers	du	Centre	d’études	de	
l’emploi”	series	and	titled	Les	Économies	de	la	Grandeur.	The	1991	version	had	a	new	postface,	a	longer	title	
including	the	term	“justification”	as	well	as	a	slightly	changed	terminology.	Some	elements	of	the	theoretical	
foundations	of	On	Justification	were	developed	by	Luc	Boltanski	in	parallel	in	another	book	published	in	
between	(1990),	L’Amour	et	la	Justice	comme	Compétences.	Trois	Essais	de	Sociologie	de	l’Action	(translated	
in	2012as	Love	and	Justice	as	Competences.	Three	Essays	on	the	Sociology	of	Action).	The	empirical	material	
used	by	Boltanski	and	Thévenot	to	develop	their	ideas	between	1987	and	1991	is	a	series	of	empirical	
studies	conducted	by	various	sociologists	and	grouped	in	the	collective	book	they	edited	in	1989	and	titled:	
Justesse	et	Justice	dans	le	Travail	(Paris,	Presses	Universitaires	de	France,	not	yet	published	in	English	to	the	
best	of	our	knowledge).		
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Budapest	to	seminars	at	the	GSPM	in	Paris.	That	ethnographic	research	was	conducted	in	
several	Hungarian	factories	(the	paper	eventually	focused	on	one)	where	groups	of	
workers	inside	state-owned	enterprises	had	been	allowed	to	form	“intrapreneurial”	units	
that	subcontracted	to	produce	goods	or	services	on	the	off	hours	and	on	weekends.	
“From	6	to	2	we	work	for	them,”	so	the	saying	went,	“from	2	to	6	we	work	for	ourselves.”	
The	situation	was	an	organizational	sociologist’s	dream:	in	the	same	setting	with	the	same	
technology	and	the	same	employees,	workers	operated	in	two	different	forms	of	
organization,	shifting	within	a	single	day	from	work	that	was	bureaucratically	organized	to	
work	that	they	non-bureaucratically	organized	themselves	(electing	their	own	
representatives,	pricing	their	products,	and	distributing	their	earnings).		
	
The	Hungarian	“experiment”	was	also	the	perfect	setting	to	put	in	play	the	ideas	that	
Boltanski	and	Thévenot	were	hammering	out	in	Paris.	“Yes,	they’re	right!”	you	could	
almost	hear	me	shout,	“There’s	not	one	economy,	but	many.	And	I	can	find	them	in	one	
factory.”		The	same	for	the	concept	of	worth	as	inextricably	economic	and	moral,	which	I	
could	elaborate	by	reuniting	the	notions	of	value	and	values	that	had	been	disciplinarily	
separated	to	economics	and	sociology	in	“Parsons’	Pact.”4	Or	similarly	with	their	useful	
notion	of	tests	or	“proofs	of	worth”	which	I	could	see	markedly	enacted	in	the	Budapest	
machine	tool	makers	painful	(and	never	entirely	successful)	efforts	to	construct	internal	
payment	systems	that	would	fairly	allocate	their	earnings	while	affirming	their	self-
identities.		
	
If	these	concepts	helped	me	to	analyze	the	research	materials	from	my	ethnographic	field	
work	(with	János	Lukács)	in	Hungary	during	the	1980s,	they	would	also	serve	me	well	in	
New	York	City	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s.	With	Monique	Girard	I	studied	a	new	media	
start	up	in	Manhattan’s	Silicon	Alley,	analyzing	how	its	daily	functioning	and	its	dynamics	
over	time	could	be	understood	as	the	repeated	interchange	among	distinct	orders	of	
worth	as	programmers,	interactive	designers,	information	architects,	merchandising	
specialists,	and	business	strategists	disagreed	about	what	was	valuable.		Similarly,	with	
Daniel	Beunza	we	showed	that	the	search	for	value	in	the	derivatives	trading	room	of	a	
major	international	investment	bank	on	Wall	Street	was	organized	by	the	discrete	
principles	of	valuation	within	and	across	the	various	arbitrage	desks	(merger	arbitrage,	
statistical	arbitrage,	index,	convertible	bonds,	etc.).		Hungarian	factory,	new	media	
startup,	Wall	Street	trading	room	–	each	was	a	setting	where	multiple	economies	of	worth	
were	at	play.		
																																																						
4	With	the	notion	of	“Parsons’	Pact”	I	refer	to	Talcott	Parsons’	conversations	with	his	colleagues	in	Harvard’s	
Department	of	Economics	when	he	launched	his	grand	scheme	to	colonize	the	social	sciences	–	with	the	
exception	of	economics.	As	I	expressed	it	colloquially:	You,	the	economists,	study	value;	we	sociologists	
study	values.	You	study	the	economy;	we	study	the	social	relations	in	which	economies	are	embedded.	
(Stark	2009,	p.	7).		Similar	to	the	move	in	Science	and	Technology	Studies	to	shift	from	the	Mertonian	
problem	of	studying	the	institutions	in	which	science	is	embedded	to	studying	the	actual	practices	of	
scientists	at	work	in	the	laboratory,	I	argued	that	economic	sociologists	should	shift	to	studying	the	actual	
practices	of	valuation	in	the	economy.	The	concept	of	worth	is	interesting	because	it	conotes	values	and	
value,	esteem	and	estimation.		See	Stark	2009,	pp.	7-10.	
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But	as	this	brief	accounting	indicates,	while	I	was	utilizing	the	concept	of	orders	of	worth,	
at	no	point	did	I	operationalize	them	as	instantiations	of	the	famous	sextet	–	market,	
inspiration,	civic,	industrial,	domestic,	and	fame	–	elaborated	in	On	Justification.	My	
account	of	the	Hungarian	tool	makers,	for	example,	naively	referred	to	the	three	
economies	inside	the	socialist	factory	using	the	Polanyian	triplicate	–	market,	
redistribution,	reciprocity.	That	was	the	formulation	I	used	when	I	first	presented	“Work,	
Worth,	and	Justice”	at	the	GSPM	in	December	1986.	I	remember	it	well.	My	field	notes	
were	hardly	dry	(no	laptops	in	those	prehistoric	times),	my	text	was	littered	with	brackets	
“[to	be	completed],”	and	my	voice	doubtless	conveyed	my	enthusiasm	at	the	opportunity	
to	give	living	shape	to	the	ideas	that	were	being	discussed	in	the	seminar.	Laurent	took	
the	floor	immediately	as	I	was	to	take	questions.	The	message	to	the	PhD	students	was	
not	subtle:	I	had	not	understood	the	theory,	my	eclectic	efforts	were	misleading,	and	I	
should	not	be	emulated.	Yes,	I	was	an	early	adopter.	But	the	first	user,	it	seems,	was	also	
the	first	abuser.			
	
Coordination	
	
It	would	be	a	safe	estimate	that	my	subsequent	conversations	with	Luc	and	Laurent	
numbered	in	the	dozens.	Not	hundreds,	but	numerous	nonetheless	–	in	Paris	or	at		
Wisconsin,	Cornell,	and	Columbia	where	I	was	affiliated,	as	well	as	at	various	seminars,	
workshops,	and	conferences	where	we	met	over	the	years.	I	had	not	given	second	
thought	to	my	abuser	status;	and,	besides,	there	was	work	to	be	done	to	make	the	book	
available	to	the	English-reading	audience.	After	suffering	a	botched	translation,	we	found	
an	excellent	translator	(Catherine	Porter),	and	On	Justification	was	published	in	2006	by	
Princeton	University	Press	for	which	I	wrote	the	jacket	blurb:			
	
"Boltanski	and	Thévenot's	On	Justification	is	one	of	the	most	important	
contributions	to	the	field	of	economic	sociology	in	the	past	decade.	It	does	
not	fit	neatly	into	any	of	the	major	theoretical	perspectives	that	currently	
dominate	the	field	–	institutionalism,	organizational	ecology,	network	
analysis,	rational	choice,	or	transaction-cost	economics.	But	precisely	
because	it	is	so	original,	it	has	great	potential	to	chart	new	territory	and	
enliven	debates.	The	book	has	already	had	an	enormous	impact	in	France,	
where	it	is	one	of	the	founding	documents	of	the	'economics	of	
conventions'	school.	It	is	sure	to	have	a	big	impact	in	sociology	in	the	
United	States	and	Britain	too.	I	could	list	at	least	twenty	major	sociologists	
who	have	asked	me	when	the	book	will	be	translated."		
	
Ten	years	is	not	really	enough	time	to	make	something	an	historical	document,	but	it	is	
interesting	to	look	back	on	these	remarks	in	light	of	what	transpired.	Rational	choice	and	
transaction-cost	economics	did	not	have	a	major	influence	in	sociology	(few	these	days	
would	consider	them	perspectives	contending	with	the	other	approaches),	and	On	
Justification	no	longer	looks	like	a	founding	document	of	the	“conventions”	school	–	
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because	its	impact	has	been	so	strong	that	we	think	of	it	now	as	founding	something	of	its	
own.		As	my	remarks	correctly	anticipated,	it	has	charted	new	territory	outside	the	
conventional	approaches,	even	while	researchers	working	within	the	institutionalist,	
organizational	ecology,	or	network	analytic	perspectives	draw	on	its	insights.		
	
My	book,	The	Sense	of	Dissonance:	Accounts	of	Worth	in	Economic	Life,	is	rightly	regarded	
as	a	contribution	to	the	theoretical	path	outlined	by	Boltanski	and	Thévenot.	Its	
introductory	chapter,	for	example,	explicitly	acknowledges	the	influence	of	On	
Justification.	But	Thévenot	was	right	to	warn	his	PhD	students	that	I	was	a	less	than	
faithful	follower	–	but	not	because	I	had	misunderstood	their	argument	or	because	I	had	
failed	to	construct	my	argument	in	terms	of	their	canonical	“economies.”	Instead,	as	I	also	
make	explicit	in	The	Sense	of	Dissonance	(Stark	2009,	pp.	xiii-xiv	and	10-15),	the	findings	
from	my	field	research	were	leading	me	to	take	issue	with	parts	of	the	theory.		
	
For	Boltanski	and	Thévenot,	the	principles	of	justification	that	comprise	an	order	of	worth	
matter	because	they	make	it	possible	for	actors	to	coordinate	their	actions.	In	a	world	of	
uncertainty,5	we	confront	situations.	What’s	going	on	here?		When	the	situation	is	not	just	
any	old	setting	but	a	set	up	–	in	which	the	principles	of	one	order	of	worth	are	those	most	
readily	available	for	action	–	then	uncertainty	is	dispelled	and	we	can	act.	No	longer	
uncertain	about	what	counts,	I	can	act	and,	most	importantly,	we	can	coordinate	our	
actions.		Agreement	about	which	order	of	worth	is	operative	(typically	unstated,	but	with	
the	means	for	justification	immediately	to	hand)	facilitates	coordination.	That	is	the	
argument.	But	the	field	research	that	forms	the	substantive	chapters	of	my	book	and	
subsequent	network	analytic	research	have	given	me	reason	to	think	differently.	
	
There	is	not	much	about	which	economists	and	sociologists	agree.	But	there	is	one	notion	
that	they	hold	in	common:	Friction	is	bad.	In	economics,	“friction”	is	the	problem	to	be	
overcome	by	“lowered	transaction	costs”	(Williamson	1981).	In	sociology,	coordination	is	
made	possible	by	what	is	shared	by	the	members	of	a	group	or	organization	–	shared	
values,	shared	norms,	shared	expectations,	shared	understandings.	Here	too	friction	is	
bad.	Impediments	to	coordination	can	be	resolved,	in	the	pop	sociology	vernacular,	“if	we	
all	just	get	together	and	iron	out	our	differences.”	Just	as	economists	emphasize	smooth	
transactions,	so	organizational	theorists	of	whatever	disciplinary	stripe	laud	the	smooth	
transmission	of	information	(Borgatti	and	Cross	2003;	Coleman	1988).			
	
But	as	my	tire	dealer	and	I	know,	friction	is	not	always	a	bad	thing.	On	a	snowy,	icy	road	I	
don’t	want	things	to	be	smooth.	Widespread	agreement	in	an	organization	or	in	a	market	
can	lead	to	conformity	and	calamity.	Price	bubbles,	for	example,	are	the	market	
equivalent	of	a	too	smooth,	icy	road.	With	Sheen	Levine	and	other	colleagues,	we	
designed	an	experimental	market	to	test	the	effect	of	ethnic	diversity	on	price	bubbles.		
																																																						
5	The	preoccupation	with	uncertainty	stems	from	their	close	involvement	with	the	French	group	working	on	
the	economics	of	convention.	See	Stark	(2009,	pp.	10-15).		For	more	on	the	Conventions	School	see	Jagd	
(2007).		
	 7	
Our	findings	showed	that	markets	where	traders	were	all	of	the	same	ethnicity	(whether	
in	Singapore	or	in	Texas)	exhibited	considerably	worse	bubbles	and	mispricing.	Ethnic	
diversity,	we	concluded,	disrupts	conformity	and	leads	to	better	information	processing	
(Levine	et	al	2014).			
	
But	friction	is	not	only	important	for	error	detection.		Across	very	different	settings,	the	
field	research	for	The	Sense	of	Dissonance	found	that	action	–	and,	in	particular,	
innovative	action	–	was	facilitated	not	by	convergence	or	agreement	on	a	principle	of	
justification	but	by	the	divergence	of	evaluative	principles.	In	fact,	more	than	the	simple	
coexistence	of	orders	of	worth,	innovation	is	promoted	by	the	collision	of	evaluative	
principles.	It	is	when	things	do	not	fit	together	comfortably	that	novel	recombinations	
become	thinkable.	Disagreement	about	what’s	valuable	can	make	for	new	value	
propositions.	Organizations	create	wealth	when	they	support	dissonant	principles	of	
worth.6	
	
Thus,	whereas	the	Introduction	of	The	Sense	of	Dissonance	opened	with	the	principles	of	
On	Justification,	by	the	concluding	chapter	I	was	considering	the	idea	that	we	can	act	in	
concert	when	we	do	not	agree	about	why	our	actions	are	valuable.	Whereas	much	
sociological	thinking	holds	that	coordination	is	possible	because	of	shared	understandings,	
I	wondered	whether	a	kind	of	innovative	coordination	was	possible	because	of	our	
misunderstandings	(Stark	2009	pp.	190-5).		
	
Can	misunderstanding	be	a	means	of	coordination?	The	question	is	deliberately	
provocative.	What	I	intend	to	provoke	are	further	research	questions.	What	are	the	limits	
of	dissonance?		Can	dissonance	be	managed?		What	are	the	social	structural	(or	
organizational)	conditions	under	which	the	friction	of	misunderstandings	can	become	a	
productive	tension?			
	
This	last	challenge	was	the	animating	research	question	of	a	project	I	recently	conducted	
with	my	former	PhD	students	Mathijs	de	Vaan	and	Balazs	Vedres.	As	in	the	three	
ethnographic	case	studies	in	my	book,	here,	too,	the	problem	was	to	study	the	factors	
that	facilitate	innovation	when	the	unit	of	creativity	is	a	team.		But	for	this	study,	instead	
of	ethnography	we	used	the	tools	of	historical	network	analysis.			
	
Our	goal	was	to	understand	the	sociological	factors	that	explain	why	some	creative	teams	
are	able	to	produce	a	cultural	product	that	is	not	only	inventive	but	also	critically	
																																																						
6	The	organizational	form	that	promotes	this	reflexivity	is	a	heterarchy.		I	take	the	term	from	
McCulloch	(1945).		Heterarchy	is	not	simply	the	absence	or	flattening	of	hierarchy	but	involves,	
just	as	importantly,	the	organized	dissonance	of	rivalrous	evaluative	principles	(see	especially,	
Stark	2009:	pp.	19-31).	Heterachies	are	not	necessarily	themselves	organizations;	and,	as	a	social	
form,	they	can	be	quite	stable:	The	U.S.	Constitution	enscribes	a	heterarchical	form	in	the	
relationship	among	the	branches	of	the	federal	government.	Their	multiple	principles	of	
justification	are	not	an	organizational	or	conceptual	hierarchy	(Stark	2009,	p.	31).			
	 8	
successful.	In	cultural	fields	where	the	difference	between	“exciting”	and	“weird”	can	be	
razor	thin,	a	product	can	be	innovative	without	being	successful	and	can	be	successful	
without	being	innovative.	To	be	a	game	changer,	the	team	must	make	a	product	that	is	
not	only	distinctive	but	also	highly	regarded.	It	must	stand	out	and	be	deemed	
outstanding	(de	Vaan,	Vedres,	and	Stark	2015).			
	
To	study	this	problem,	we	collected	data	on	every	commercially	released	video	game	in	
the	global	video	game	industry	from	1979	to	2009.	The	dataset	we	analyzed	comprised	
approximately	12,500	video	games	and	the	career	histories	of	some	140,000	video	game	
developers.	Because	we	had	data	on	every	video	game	we	were	able	to	reconstruct,	for	
each	team,	the	histories	of	all	of	the	developers	who	worked	together	on	it.	Two	variables	
were	of	greatest	interest:	one	measuring	cognitive	distance,	another	measuring	group	
structure.	For	the	former,	we	could	reconstruct	for	every	member	on	the	team	the	
complete	set	of	cognitive	(or	stylistic)	elements	to	which	that	developer	had	been	
exposed.	With	this	we	could	compute	the	cognitive	distance	among	the	members	of	every	
team.	Teams	whose	members	had	worked	on	very	similar	games	would	have	little	difficult	
communicating	and	could	understand	each	other	easily;	teams	whose	members	had	
worked	on	games	in	the	past	with	very	different	elements	would	have	greater	difficulty	
understanding	each	other.		
	
For	the	social	structural	variable,	we	were	interested	in	exploring	how	a	team	is	not	just	
composed	of	individuals	but	is	made	up	of	groups,	analyzed	here	as	members	who	had	
worked	together	in	the	past	on	a	prior	videogame.	Once	we	had	identified	the	various	
groups	in	a	team	on	this	basis	we	could	then	compute	the	cognitive	distance	across	
groups	as	well	as	move	to	analyze	the	patterns	of	ties	connecting	them	(again	based	on	
prior	co-participation).	In	the	more	familiar	network	analytic	terms,	groups	could	be	
“isolates”	or	they	could	brokered	across	a	“structural	hole.”	But	we	also	identified	a	third	
topographic	feature	in	which	groups	could	be	“structurally	folded”	(Vedres	and	Stark	
2010)	where	cohesive	groups	overlapped.			
	
Our	findings	indicated	that	game	changing	success	was	most	likely	when	cognitively	
distant	groups	were	structurally	folded.		Such	teams	were	held	in	tension:	cognitive	
distance	was	pulling	the	groups	apart	while	structural	folding	was	binding	them	together.	
The	combination	was	a	productive	tension	that	helped	to	mitigate	the	two	greatest	
threats	facing	creative	teams	with	dissonant	patterns.	On	the	one	side	there	is	the	
problem	in	which	the	initial	moment	of	misunderstanding	results	in	quick	dismissal.		On	
the	other	side	is	the	problem	of	reaching	agreement	too	quickly	–	but	at	the	level	of	the	
lowest	common	demoninator.	Cognitive	distance	impeded	the	smooth	flow	of	
information,	and	the	resulting	eddies	and	pools	were	opportunities	for	departures	from	
existing	routines.	Meanwhile,	the	pockets	of	trust	established	by	structural	folding	
created	an	atmosphere	in	which	the	operative	mode	was	“hold	tight”	–	be	patient,	
tolerate	the	ambiguity,	look	for	new	openings.	Teams	with	these	characteristics	produced	
game	changing	products	that	were	innovative	and	critically	acclaimed.		
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Returning	to	the	broader	theme	of	the	importance	of	principled	agreement,	there	will,	of	
course,	be	those	who	say	(as	I	caricature):		It’s	good	to	think	about	alternative	views,	but	
when	all	is	said	and	done,	for	a	group	to	function	effectively	it	needs	a	common	purpose.	
There	needs	to	be	agreement.	A	for-profit	company,	for	example,	has	to	be	looking	to	the	
bottom	line.	You	can’t	have	people	acting	like	it's	a	kindergarten	or	an	art	school.			
	
To	this,	we	can	make	the	rejoinder	that	companies	that	pay	exclusive	focus	to	the	bottom	
line	do	so	at	their	peril.	It	needn’t	be	a	kindergarten,	but	shouldn’t	inspiring	its	employees	
and	caring	for	their	well	being	be	important	objectives?	Similarly,	short	term	profits	that	
interfere	with	making	a	great	product	or	that	scoff	at	civic	virtues	can	lead	to	ruin.	
Moreover,	what’s	the	value	of	a	great	product	if	no	one	is	paying	attention?		Rather	than	
agreement	within	a	market	monoculture,	the	heterarchy	of	such	evaluative	principles	can	
be	the	course	to	long	term	viability.7		Notably,	we	can	re-express	the	statements	in	terms	
of	orders	of	worth	–	in	order	as	they	appear	in	this	paragraph:	market,	inspiration,	
domestic,	industrial,	civic,	and	fame	–	precisely	the	canonical	economies	of	On	
Justification.			
	
	
Valuation		
	
The	brevity	of	my	summary	of	On	Justification	(page	6	above)	necessarily	did	violence	to	
the	nuances	of	its	argument.	But	it	had	the	virtue	of	focusing	on	two	or	three	core	
premises.	When	discussing	Boltanski	and	Thévenot’s	views	on	coordination	I	pointed	to	
their	emphasis	on	the	situation.	Although	I	turn	now	from	coordination	to	valuation,	the	
emphasis	will	remain	on	analyzing	the	situation.	Valuation	takes	place	in	situations.		
	
What	is	the	situation?	What’s	going	on	here?	The	questions	are	interesting	because	they	
are	ones	facing	the	social	actors.	How	do	I	size	up	the	situation?		For	the	social	actor	this	
does	not	mean	just	accepting	the	situation	as	a	given;	it	can	also	mean	the	attempt	to	
make	the	situation	one	in	which	the	scales	of	valuation	will	measure	in	units	in	which	my	
value	is	sizable	(Stark	1996,	pp.	1013-14;	Stark	2009,	pp.	68-72).	The	questions	are	also	
interesting	because	they	are	ones	that	the	analyst	should	be	asking.	In	fact,	whereas	too	
much	of	the	field	of	organization	studies	sees	a	methodological	institutionalism	as	the	
only	alternative	to	methodological	individualism,	in	fact,	there	is	alternative	to	both:	
methodological	situationalism	(Knorr-Cetina	1981;	Stark	2009,	pp	9-10,	31-33,	and	185).		
	
This	emphasis	on	the	situation	is	the	key	theme	running	through	the	chapters	in			
Moments	of	Valuation:	Exploring	Sites	of	Dissonance,	a	volume	I	recently	co-edited	with			
with	Ariane	Berthoin	Antal	and	Michael	Hutter.	As	Michael	Hutter	and	I	argued	in	the	
introductory	essay,	valuation	always	takes	place	in	situations	–	by	which	we	mean	that	
valuation	is	1)	spatially	localized	and	2)	temporally	marked	(Hutter	and	Stark	2015).	Thus,	
																																																						
7 The	same	argument	applies	not	only	at	the	organizational	level	but	at	the	societal	level	as	well	
(Stark,	2009,	“Reprise,”	pp.	204-212).		
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studying	valuation	in	situ	requires,	first,	detailed	accounts	of	how	the	setting	is	setup	as	
an	assemblage	whether	this	be	in	the	stagings,	equipments,	and	protocols	of	public	
situations	such	as	the	court	room,	the	concert	hall,	or	the	wine	tasting	or	in	the	
specialized	tools,	devices	and	materials	of	the	less	public	assemblages	such	as	the	
laboratory,	the	architectural	studio,	or	the	perfume	counter.				
	
Second,	studying	valuation	in	situations	requires	detailed	analysis	of	how	it	takes	place	in	
discrete	moments	of	time	when	evaluative	attention	is	particularly	acute:	the	attentive	
moment	when	a	dinner	guest	first	sips	a	glass	of	wine	(Hennion	2015),	the	instant	when	a	
luxury	perfume	is	sprayed	into	a	special	device	allowing	the	customer	a	sense	of	its	sillage	
(the	scented	trail	left	by	a	fragrance	wearer)	(Trébuchet-Breitwiller	2015),	or	the	moment	
when	the	professional	art	appraiser	is	cross-examined	in	the	courtroom	witness	box	
(Brewer	2015).		
	
Such	attentive	moments,	I	want	to	stress,	are	critical	moments.	They	are	critical,	not	only	
because	they	frequently	involve	a	critic	(and,	of	course,	many	moments	of	valuation	do	
not	have	critics,	judges,	juries,	and	reviewers).	They	are	critical,	more	importantly,	
because	they	are	moments	when	the	outcome	is	not	fully	set	up	in	advance.	Critical	
because	outcomes	depend	on	what	happens,	on	who	does	what	when	in	the	critical	
moment.	They	are	critical	moments,	above	all,	because	they	can	be	contested.	For	all	its	
emphasis	on	logics	of	action,	methodological	institutionalism	has	lots	of	logics	but	seldom	
has	action	–	and	even	less	dispute.	A	program	of	methodological	situationalism,	by	
contrast,	will	pay	attention	to	those	moments	that	John	Dewey	called	“troubling	and	
perplexing	situations”	(Dewey	1998,	p.	140)	–	in	the	vernacular,	“Uh,	oh,	we	have	a	
situation	on	our	hands	here”	–	as	it	highlights	the	sites	and	critical	moments	of	dispute	
and	contestation.		
	
For	the	further	study	of	valuation,	two	inter-related	research	problems	seem	particularly	
promising.	Let’s	refer	to	the	first	question	as	pricing	or	prizing.		About	pricing	economists	
have	written	much,	and	sociologists	and	anthropologists	are	now	contributing	new	
insights	(Beckert,	2001;	Guyer,	2009;	Muniesa,	2007;	and	Velthuis	2005).	But	I	turn	
immediately	to	“prizing”	for	it	is	likely	to	be	more	surprising.	By	prizes	one	might	think	
first	of	the	Nobel	Prizes,	Pulitzer	Prizes,	and	Oscar	Awards	(and	more	on	such	
competitions	below).	Here	I	want	to	expand	the	notion	of	prizing	as	an	activity	of	
appraising	(comparable	to	but	different	from	pricing)	even	when	it	does	not	literally	take	
the	form	of	an	award.		
	
Merchants	price	items	in	their	stores.	Reviewers	prize	a	movie	by	awarding	it	3	stars;	
Robert	Parker	awards	prizes	to	wines	when	he	scores	some	higher	some	lower;	and	
colleges	are	prized	when	ranked	highly	by	US	News	and	World	Report	(Sauder	and	
Espeland	2009).		Prices	might	or	might	not	correlate	with	such	prizings,	but	the	important	
point	to	note	is	that	the	modality	of	denoting	value	is	not	the	same	in	prizing	as	in	pricing.		
We	are	surrounded	by	such	ratings	and	rankings.	And	they	need	not	be	performed	by	
institutionally	recognized	actors.	Consumers	issue	value	judgements	when	they	rate	
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products;	students	evaluate	their	professor’s	lectures	on	a	scale	of	1	to	5;	and	Airbnb	
guests	and	hosts	can	punish	their	counterparts	by	withholding	a	prized	rating.	Much	
prizing	is	ordinal:	take	the	ubiquity	of	Top	Ten	lists.	But	it	need	not	be.	We	praise,	we	
appraise,	we	prize	in	formats	as	simple	as	a	binary	up	or	down	–	like,	dislike.	We	do	so	
often,	some	of	us	many	times	in	a	day.	And	as	millions	and	millions	of	us	do	it	in	ways	that	
can	be	digitally	captured	and	analyzed,	such	prizings	offer	new	means	to	register	value	
judgements	in	the	economy.			
	
With	the	growth	of	a	vast	digital	repository	of	prizings	and	appraisings,	much	of	it	time-
stamped	data,	it	is	now	possible	to	chart	these	activities	of	valuation	in	real	time.	
Whereas	economists	have	long	had	time-sensitive	data	on	price	movements,	we	now	
have	alternative	(not	separate	but	complimentary)	data	bases	on	the	movements	of	
prizing	and	appraising	that	register	consumer	attachments.	These	“valuemeters”	will	need	
new	measures	and	metrics	(Latour	and	Lepinay	2009:	16).	They	can	be	quantified,	but	
these	metrics	of	personal	value	judgements	need	not	be	expressed	in	terms	of	money.	In	
fact,	we	will	need	to	avoid	the	quick	temptation	to	assess	how	prizing	and	appraising	
translate	to	pricing.	That	is	the	work	for	corporate	(and	startup)	research	departments.	
The	task	for	economic	sociology	will	be	to	develop	new	metrics	of	what’s	valuable	(the	
prizings	and	appraisings	that	give	us	access	to	value	judgement)	–	valuable	precisely	
because	they	are	metrics	that	are	alternatives	to	prices.			
 
If	pricing	and	prizing	is	the	first	promising	area	for	further	research	in	the	field	of	valuation	
studies,	I	suggest	that	we	think	of	the	second	problem	as	competition	and	competitions.	
Like	pricing,	competition	is	well-studied	as	a	means	of	determining	value.			
But	increasingly	we	find	organized	competitions	as	an	alternative	means	of	addressing	the	
question	“What’s	valuable?”		Whereas	I	stressed	that	it	was	important	to	study	situations	
as	potentially	contested	moments,	here	I	propose	that	we	pay	attention	to	actual	
contests.	Thus,	alongside	market	competition	as	a	coordinating	mechanism	of	valuation	in	
the	economy	we	also	find	organized	competitions.8		In	the	first	type	we	find	actors	
competing	on	markets.	In	the	second	type,	we	find	contests	with	entry	rules,	judges,	and	
prizes	granted	to	the	announced	winners.	On	one	side,	competition	is	an	ongoing,	
seamless,	and	seemingly	endless	process;	on	the	other,	competitions	are	discrete,	
bounded	in	time	and	location.			
	
In	this	line	of	thinking	the	overarching	research	questions	would	be:	What	is	the	role	of	
competitions	in	a	competitive	society?		Does	competition	need	competitions?		Are	market	
																																																						
8	See	especially	Kreiner’s	(2012)	study	of	architectural	competitions.	His	finding	that	judges	first	
select	winners	and	only	then	formulate	selection	criteria	is	a	valuable	insight	applicable	to	an	
important	subset	of	competitions.	Solaroli	(2015)	studies	the	World	Press	Photo	Competition,	
showing	that	the	competition	does	not	simply	judge	contestants	according	to	stable	criteria	but	
instead	consecrates	evolving	standards.		McCormick’s	(2009)	study	of	international	music	
competitions	points	to	the	mixed	character	as	contests	and	rituals.				
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competition	and	organized	competitions	mutually	reinforcing	or	do	they	express	
alternative	(we	might	even	say	“competing”)	logics?		
	
Take,	for	example,	the	notion	of	winning,	so	fundamental	within	the	logic	of	a	game	or	
contest.	Is	winning	operative	in	the	logic	of	the	market?		Perhaps	so,	but	less	because	one	
competitor	defeats	the	other	than	because	one	of	the	rivals	has	won	the	customer.	
Markets,	in	this	view,	are	not	so	much	a	head-to-head	battle	among	contestants	or	a	
dyadic	matching	of	buyer	and	seller	but	rather	a	triadic	relation	in	which	two	compete	for	
valuation	by	a	third.	As	Georg	Simmel	observed,	“Modern	competition,	which	has	been	
called	the	struggle	of	all	against	all,	is	after	all	the	struggle	of	all	to	gain	the	attention	of	
all”	(Simmel	2008).		
	
This	insight,	in	turn,	might	prompt	us	to	think	about	competitions	varying	according	to	
whether	they	are	head-to-head	contests	or	of	the	triadic	form	of	winning	the	favor	of	
judges,	jury,	or	audience.	We	could	also	consider	whether	the	organized	competition	is	
economic	or	non-economic.	The	resulting	2x2	table	–	head-to-head	vs	triadic	along	one	
axis,	economic	vs	non-economic	along	the	other	–	is	a	good	start	for	a	research	agenda.		
Whereas	one	might	conventionally	map	competition	to	economic	activity	and	
competitions	to	the	non-economic,	research	should	be	attuned	to	social	forms	that	are	
migrating	from	one	domain	of	social	life	to	another.		When	competition	takes	place	in	
traditionally	non-economic	realms	(such	as	hospitals	and	universities),	does	this	entail	the	
introduction	of	a	market	logic?		On	the	other	side,	we	need	research	that	examines	the	
historical	patterns	and	the	contemporary	effects	of	the	emergence	of	organized	
competitions	(sustainability	rankings	or	“green”	prizes)	inside	the	economy.		
For	example,	what	is	the	historical	process	whereby	the	notion	of	a	score	moved	from	the	
field	of	sports	to	the	domain	of	business?		Credit	scores	are	an	interesting	case,	suggesting	
that	price	itself	is	not	always	a	sufficient	indicator	of	value.	More	generally,	what	is	the	
social	meaning	of	scores	and	rankings	in	business	settings	where	the	market	logic	is	
overtly	dominant?		Are	rankings	simply	one	more	form	of	market	competition?	Or	do	they	
introduce	yet	another,	perhaps	differently	configured,	social	form	as	a	way	of	introducing	
alternative	values	into	the	market?		If	rankings	are	ordered	according	to	revenues	or	
market	share	or	capitalization,	perhaps	not.	But	what	if	the	scores	and	rankings	concern	
environmental	and	social	sustainability?		Such	rankings	could	be	configured	as	the	
introduction	of	alternative	forms	of	valuation	into	the	economy	(see,	e.g.,	Déjean,	Gond,	
and	Leca	2004).		
	
Will	Davies	addresses	some	of	these	issues	in	his	recent	book,	The	Limits	of	Neoliberalism:	
Authority,	Sovereignty	&	the	Logic	of	Competition	(Davies	2014).	Davies	points	out	that	
early	proponents	of	neo-liberalism	such	as	von	Hayek	looked	to	competition	as	the	key	
principle	of	justification,	and	strongly	believed	that	decentralized	markets	were	the	best	
means	for	promoting	a	free,	competitive	society.	But	Davies	does	not	equate	neo-
liberalism	with	advocacy	of	market	competition.	He	suggests	that	neo-liberalism	evolved	
as	it	developed	responses	to	a	challenging	question:	
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“[I]f	the	critical	market	principle	is	competition,	might	there	be	other,	non-
market	institutions,	policies	and	interventions	which	might	just	as	easily	deliver	
the	specific	virtues	of	competitive	practices?	For	example,	in	the	era	of	applied	
neoliberalism,	sport	very	often	served	as	a	better	manifestation	of	the	market	
ethos	than	markets	themselves,	with	politicians	and	business	leaders	defending	
economic	inequality	through	analogies	to	sporting	contests	and	‘talent.’	League	
tables	are	another	way	of	giving	empirical	and	technical	form	to	the	competitive	
market	ideal.	Is	market	competition	necessary	to	deliver	competitiveness?	
(Davies,	2014,	pp.	43-4).			
	
Davies	argues	that	later	neo-liberals	such	as	Ronald	Coase	and	others	answered	this	
question	by	separating	markets	and	competition.	Competition	remained	the	legitimating	
principle,	but	it	could	be	found	in	social	and	organizational	forms	that	were	not	markets.	
In	Davies’	view,	for	these	later	economists	and	policy	advocates,	the	key	analytic	concept	
was	neither	market	competition	nor	organized	competitions	but	a	more	generalized	
notion	of	competition	as	competitiveness.			
	
In	which	direction	will	sociology	move?		One	course	has	already	been	taken.	It	finds	
competition	in	every	domain.	Not	as	a	principle	of	justification,	competition	nonetheless	
becomes	the	key	to	analyze	social	dynamics	because	any	field	can	be	assumed	to	be	one	
of	competitive	struggle	whether	that	be	the	economy,	law,	science,	politics,	or	the	arts.	
Pierre	Bourdieu	was	certainly	not	a	neo-liberal,	but	among	social	theorists	he	went	the	
furthest	to	place	a	generalized	notion	of	competition	at	the	center	of	his	theory.	My	
suggestion	to	examine	the	complex	relationship	between	market	competition	and	
organized	competitions	steps	back	from	Bourdieu’s	approach.	In	place	of	assuming	
competitiveness	as	a	part	of	the	human	condition	and	of	competition	as	occuring	in	every	
field,	it	proposes	to	examine	the	changing	historical	relationship	between	competition	
and	competitions	and	to	study	variation	in	the	specific	and	discrete	practices	of	contest	
and	contestation.		
	
Conclusion	
	
The	reader	now	faces	a	“critical	moment”	not	unlike	those	moments	of	judgment	I	
discussed	earlier	in	this	essay.	I	mean,	of	course,	how	do	you	assess	the	value	of	this	essay	
as	a	contribution	to	a	volume,	Justification,	Evaluation	and	Critique	in	the	Study	of	
Organizations?	Was	it	worth	it?	Some	readers	might	read	the	essay	itself	as	a	critical	
moment,	an	opportunity	to	pass	critical	judgment	about	On	Justification,	the	book	from	
which	its	takes	its	point	of	departure.	That	was	not	my	intention.		
	
But	who	am	I,	who	earlier	championed	misunderstanding,	to	object	to	that	
misunderstanding?	Accepting	that	misunderstanding	for	this	critical	moment,	we	should	
reflect	on	the	explicit	or	implicit	order	of	worth	that	the	author	was	attempting	to	
mobilize	in	his	assessment.	Reflecting	on	the	essay,	we	can	see	that	the	proofs	of	worth	
were	in	the	order	of	the	generative	as	I	pointed	to	ways	in	which	On	Justification	
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stimulated	several	decades	of	work	and	continues	to	provoke	my	research	practice.	It	is	in	
such	a	pragmatist	spirit	that	I	invite	you	to	use	the	same	frame	in	assessing	this	essay.	I	
can	only	hope	that	your	misunderstandings	will	be	fruitful.	That	is,	the	proof	of	its	value	
will	be	in	the	questions	it	provokes.			
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